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Abstract—Appropriately designed renewable support policies
can play a leading role in promoting renewable expansions
and contribute to low emission goals. Meanwhile, ill-designed
policies may distort electricity markets, put power utilities and
generation companies on an unlevel playing field and, in turn,
cause inefficiencies. This paper proposes a framework to optimize
policymaking for renewable energy sources, while incorporating
conflicting interests and objectives of different stakeholders. We
formulate a tri-level optimization problem where each level
represents a different entity: a state regulator, a power utility and
a wholesale electricity market. To solve this tri-level problem, we
exploit optimality conditions and develop a modification of the
Column-and-Cut Generation (C&CG) algorithm that generates
cuts for bilinear terms. The case study based on the ISO New
England 8-zone test system reveals different policy trade-offs
that policymakers face under different decarbonization goals and
implementation scenarios.
Index Terms—Renewable support policy, renewable portfolio
standard, state regulator, tri-level optimization, decomposition
technique, column-and-cut generation
NOMENCLATURE
A. Sets and Indices
Ξ[·] Sets of variables, where [·] denotes the
regulator (R), utility (U), wholesale market
(W), master (MP), subproblem (SP) and
dual wholesale market problems (DW)
e ∈ E Set of representative operating days
i ∈ I Set of existing generators
i ∈ Iˆ Set of candidate generators
IR, IC ⊂ I Set of renewable/controllable generators
Is ⊂ I Set of generators in state s
l ∈ L Set of transmission lines
n ∈ N Set of transmission nodes
Ns ⊂ N Set of transmission nodes in state s
s ∈ S Set of states and state regulators
t ∈ T Set of time intervals
T on/off Set of on- and off-peak time intervals
r(l), o(l) Receiving/sending nodes of line l
n(i) Node where generator i is located
s(i) State where generator i is located
B. Parameters
η Tolerance of constraint violations
κs Renewable portfolio standard goal of regulator s
ωe Probability of operating day e
ρite Forecast factor of generator i
σite Normalized standard deviation of the generation
forecast error of unit i [MW]
υite Normalized mean of the generation forecast error
of unit i [MW]
Γi Minimum power output factor of controllable gen-
erator i, i.e. 0 ≤ Γi ≤ 1
BPs Budget for renewable policies of state s
C invi Capital cost of generator i (prorated on a daily ba-
sis using the net present value approach) [$/MW]
Cgi Incremental cost of generator i [$/MWh]
Dnte Real power demand of node n [MW]
Fmaxl Apparent flow limit of line l [MVA]
G
max/min
it Power output limits of existing generator i [MW]
H
max/min
i Up/down-ward ramping limits of generator i
P ↓,maxn Apparent flow limit of the interface line into node
n from the transmission network [MVA]
Xl Reactance of transmission line l [Ω]
C. Variables
αit Participation factor of controllable generator i
ite Forecast error of renewable generator i
θnte Voltage angle of transmission node n
λnte Locational marginal price in node n [$/MW]
pint Retail electricity tariff of node n
pi
on/off
n On- and off-peak retail electricity tariff of node n
τ c Capacity-based renewable energy incentive [$/kW]
τ e Energy-based renewable energy incentive [$/MWh]
dnte Flexible real power demand of node n [MW]
flte Real power flow of line l [MW]
gite Generation output of generator i [MW]
gite Forecast power output (offer into the wholesale
market) of generator i [MW]
gite Dispatch decisions of the wholesale market for gen-
erator i [MW]
gmaxi Capacity of generator i to be built [MW]
p↓nte Interface power flow into node n [MW]
We define random variables in bold and dual variables
ξlts, γite, γite, δite, δite of constraints in (6) in parentheses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The climate crisis is the foremost priority of environmen-
tal policies around the globe, and reducing CO2 emissions
from the electricity sector is a second-to-none curtailment
instrument. Electricity production accounts for 33% of annual
CO2 emissions in the U.S. and 65% of that, i.e. 1,150
MMmt out of 1,763 MMmt, is produced by coal generators
[1]. Thus, many policy-makers aim to decarbonize electric-
ity production, relying on a variety of policy instruments,
including forced power plant retirements, carbon taxes, cap-
and-trade programs, energy and capacity based incentives for
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2carbon-free resources, renewable portfolio standards (RPS),
and many others [2]. A wide literature has shown that carbon
pricing is the optimal tool for efficiently decreasing CO2
emissions from the electricity sector as well as from the
whole economy [3]–[5]. Ideally, carbon pricing would be
the main decarbonization instrument, with CO2 emissions
priced according to the marginal damages and low-emission
resources (e.g. renewables, storage, demand-side management)
given necessary subsidies. For example, these subsidies can be
based on the R&D spillover rate or compensate for generation
spillovers from learning-by-doing [4]. However, putting a price
on a unit of CO2 emission has been politically unpopular1
such that in practice, only few jurisdictions maintain mean-
ingful carbon prices [7], i.e. put a price on CO2 emissions
that comes close to the value of marginal damages from
these emissions. Instead, policy-makers have widely chosen
to rely on second-best policies of subsidizing carbon-free
generation and investment (see [2] for some of the unintended
consequences of subsidies).
Ill-designed policies can distort electricity markets and
benefit certain stakeholders over others, even leading to ar-
tificially prolonged economic life of certain generation types,
and result in inefficiencies of the entire market and power
system. Entangled interests of stakeholders and their strategic
behavior in the electricity market, along with the physical
interconnection through the system, complicate the decision-
making process even further. Hence, there is a need in policy
design tools, which are capable of taking into account different
techno-economic perspectives of stakeholders (e.g. regulators,
power utilities, generation companies, consumers, etc.) and
physical limits on power system operations.
Among a diverse set of policy instruments for grid de-
carbonization [2], we narrow our attention to incentives for
carbon-free resources, such as RES, given the relative preva-
lence and success of these incentives in the US and globally.
The RES incentives fall into two categories: energy- and
capacity-based. The former policies remunerate RES produc-
ers proportionally to their actual renewable production (e.g.
FIT, REC), while the latter policies remunerate RES producers
based on their installed capacity (e.g. PTC). Many countries
use either energy or capacity-based policies, or both of them,
depending on their socio-economic circumstances [8]. The
majority of U.S. states support RPS goals using RECs or
PTCs, while Great Britain, Japan, and China have recently
turned to FITs [8]. Regardless of the type, these policies have
played a leading role in rolling out 1,449 GW of renewables
all over the world (260 GW in the U.S.) [9].
Methodologically, the literature on RES incentives has been
dominated by empirical data analyses, rather than model-based
analyses. Huntington et al. [10] compared the performance of
capacity- and energy-based incentives in Spain and concluded
that capacity-based incentives are more compatible with elec-
1In the U.S., carbon pricing initiatives have failed both on the federal level
(e.g. Waxman-Markey bill, Coons/Feinstein bill and many others) and state
level (I-732 initiative and SB 5971 bill in Washington, SB1530 bill in Oregon,
among others). In France, carbon pricing legislation was one of the factors
behind the popular protest movement of the Yellow Vests. See also [6] for an
attempt to explain why carbon taxes are hard to pass.
tricity markets in the considered case because they do not
distort market outcomes and generation payments, thus not
affecting the efficiency of market competition in the consid-
ered setting. Furthermore, Newbery et al. [11] raised concerns
that FITs, which are a non-competitive revenue stream that
drives RES profitability, cause locational market distortions
affecting conventional producers. On the other hand, O¨zdemir
et al. [12] demonstrated that energy-based incentives are more
cost-effective for incentive providers to achieve production
goals, whereas capacity-based incentives are more desirable
in the longer term and allow for achieving RES-rich RPS
goals. Furthermore, Nicolini and Tavoni [13] analyzed the
effectiveness of RES incentives in five European countries and,
in line with [12], concluded that FITs outperformed tradable
green certificates (similar to RECs in the U.S.) in terms of
achieving a greater RES production over the period from
2000 to 2010. Although both capacity- and energy-based RES
incentives have pros and cons that have been demonstrated via
empirical data analyses in [10]–[13], regulatory and legislative
bodies still lack decision-support tools for (i) exogenous
policymaking (i.e., optimization of incentives) and (ii) on-par
comparison of different incentive types.
A critical point in designing renewable energy incentives
is the need to accommodate and balance the perspectives
of multiple stakeholders, as for example state regulators,
power utilities, generation companies, consumers, etc. Ideally,
regulators aim to select such electricity tariffs and policy
incentives that maximize the social welfare in their juris-
diction, e.g. to achieve a given RPS target in the least-cost
manner, and power utilities seek to profit from supplying
electricity to consumers, while ensuring reliable electricity
supply. Naturally, these objectives are conflicting because
power utilities benefit from a higher electricity tariff, while a
higher electricity tariff leads to a greater consumer payment,
which in turn reduces the social welfare. Furthermore, the
wholesale electricity market typically solves a social-welfare
maximization or cost minimization problem, which again trade
offs the interests of power utilities and generation companies.
Thus, setting renewable energy incentives without accounting
for the conflicting interests of stakeholders may yield both
market distortions and inefficient renewable expansion plans.
This motivates the need for developing a decision-support tool
to optimally set the electricity tariff and incentives, which
balances the interests of each stakeholder.
This paper takes the perspective of the state regulator
and develops a modeling framework to jointly optimize RES
incentives and electricity tariffs, under the given RPS goal
and incentive budget, while incorporating interactions between
the stakeholders involved. To appropriately model this multi-
stakeholder environment, the proposed framework is formu-
lated as a tri-level (TL) optimization problem, where each level
represents a different entity: a state regulator, a power utility,
and a wholesale electricity market. Additionally, the level
representing the power utility internalizes flexible demands
and time-of-use (TOU) tariffs to assess the impact and value of
the demand-side flexibility on achieving the RPS goals. Using
this TL optimization, this paper studies a complex trade-off
between the RES incentives and electricity tariffs under RPS
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Fig. 1. Structure of the proposed TL model. Note that ∗ denotes
a parameterized value of decision variables from lower decision-
making levels.
goals and different retirement scenarios.
In order to realistically model power system operations and,
in particular, the need in balancing capacity to support the
roll-out of high penetration RES levels, we model the RES
stochasticity using chance constraints, as in [14], which is
shown to have superior computational performance over tradi-
tional scenario-based stochastic programming. However, even
if chance constraints are used to alleviate some computational
complexity, commercial solvers are still not able to deal with
multi-level structure problems efficiently and, therefore, algo-
rithmic adaptations are inevitable. Thus, to solve the proposed
TL problem, we use the column-and-cut generation (C&CG)
method, which decomposes the original problem into master
and sub-problems and solves them iteratively until they reach
convergence. Unlike previous C&CG implementations in [15]–
[18], the proposed TL problem contains bilinear terms with the
multiplication of multiple-level variables. Thus, we enhance
the original C&CG algorithm further to contain auxiliary
columns for generating cuts accounting for bilinear terms.
II. MODEL
Resorting to the TL structure, Fig. 1 illustrates the proposed
model with three different stakeholders: a state regulator, a
power utility and a wholesale electricity market. Each entity is
represented by an optimization problem and the TL framework
makes it possible to implement a leader-follower structure
among entities, i.e. the state regulator is strategically more
dominant than the power utility, and the power utility can act
strategically in the wholesale electricity market. The goal of
the upper-level (UL) problem is to represent a decision-making
process of the state regulator, which sets the electricity tariffs
and RES incentives and monitors performance and policy
compliance of power utilities. The middle-level (ML) problem
parameterized with the UL decisions represents a decision-
making process of a typical US electric power distribution
utility, which decides which generations assets, both RES
and conventional, to build in order to supply electricity to
its consumers and how to operate newly built and existing
generation assets given representative load and renewable
forecasts. The ML operational decisions include the dispatch
of utility-owned assets and its participation strategy in the
wholesale electricity market. Each state is assumed to have
one power utility connected to the transmission network via
the power flow interface with the limit of P ↓,maxn . Finally, the
lower-level (LL) problem represents the wholesale electricity
market, in which the power utility modeled in the ML problem
acts strategically and the generation companies and power
utilities from other states are price takers.
A. UL problem (State regulator)
In the U.S., states can set renewable policies and provide
incentives (τ e, τ c) to support their implementation. At the
same time, they regulate electricity tariffs (pint) so that the
consumer payments are not unjustly manipulated by power
utilities, while power utilities are guaranteed to recover the
incurred costs to supply electricity reliably. Following this
practice, we formulate the problem of the state regulator as:
min
ΞR
ORs :=
∑
t∈T
∑
e∈E
ωe
[ ∑
n∈Ns
Dntepint +
∑
i∈IˆR∪IR
giteτ
e
]
+
∑
i∈IˆR
gmaxi τ
c
(1a)
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈IRs ∪IˆRs
giteτ
e +
∑
i∈IˆRs
gmaxi τ
c ≤ BPs , ∀e ∈ E , (1b)∑
t∈T
∑
i∈IRs ∪IˆRs
gite ≥ κs
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈Ns
Dnte, ∀e ∈ E , (1c)
OU(gmaxi , gite) ≥ 0, (1d)
pint =
{
pionn , ∀t ∈ T on,
pioffn , ∀t ∈ T off ,
(1e)
where ΞR = {pint, pioffn , pionn , τ e, τ c ≥ 0}. Equation (1a)
minimizes the expected total consumer payments and the
total incentives provided to support renewable expansion over
representative days e with probability ωe. This formulation
is based on two assumptions on the state regulator. First,
the state regulator aims to meet an explicitly given RPS
goal, while keeping the total cost incurred by power sector
as low as possible. Second, the state regulator can raise
money for subsidies without creating welfare losses, i.e. that
the marginal cost of public funds equals zero. Also, this
formulation considers a particular case of a multi-objective
problem with the equal weight between the consumer payment
and the total incentives, whereas this weighting preference can
be tuned according to the preference of the state regulator
and according to the actual costs of raising public funds. The
capacity-based incentive (τ c) has a net present value prorated
on a daily basis. The renewable policy budget limit is imposed
in Eq. (1b), and is procured externally from the optimization
and is decoupled from the electricity tariff (pint). The RPS
target constraint, representing a given renewable policy, is
in Eq. (1c) and the revenue adequacy (non-negative profit)
constraint for the power utility is imposed in Eq. (1d) to ensure
the power utility is not exposed to the deficit by investing in
RES, where OU is the objective function of the utility defined
in Eq. (5a). The non-negativity constraint on profits of the
utility does not preclude retirement of the assets – as we do
not model decommission costs or annual, fixed maintenance
costs, retirement of a power plant is equivalent to having zero
4capacity utilization rate of that power plant. The electricity
tariff is modeled as a time-of-use rate in Eq. (1e) while T on/off
represent on- and off-peak time sets.
B. ML problem (Power utility)
The ML problem models the power utility. First, we con-
sider flexible demand and generation models.
1) Demand: Demand elasticity can be implicitly modeled
in the ML optimization by deriving optimality conditions of
the surplus maximization problem of aggregated consumers.
An aggregated utility function of electricity consumers is non-
decreasing and concave and modeled as [19]:
U(dnte) =
{
Mdnte − N2 d2nte if 0 ≤ dnte ≤ MN ,
M
N if dnte ≥ MN ,
(2a)
where M and N are pre-determined parameters. Given elec-
tricity tariff pint, the maximized consumer surplus is:
max CSnte := (Mdnte − 1
2
Nd2nte)− pintdnte (3a)
Then, we derive a closed-form demand as a function of the
electricity tariff (dnte(pint)) via the first-order optimality con-
dition and by assuming non-zero marginal utility of electricity
(setting upper bound dnte = M/N ):
∂CSnte
∂dnte
= (M − pint)−Ndnte = 0, (3b)
dnte(pint) =
M − pint
N
. (3c)
Given (3c), the demand function depends on parameters M
and N , which are external to the optimization problem, and
the value of tariff chosen by the UL optimization. If the
power utility implements a demand-response program with
incentives for consumers to change their power consumption,
the resulting demand in (3c) can be further adjusted. For
instance, if ∆pint ≥ 0 denotes the demand-response incentive,
the resulting demand in (3c) will be set to dnte(pint+∆pint) =
M−pint−∆pint
N .
2) Generation: The uncertain RES generation output is
modeled through forecast error variables ite with Gaussian
distribution 2 G(E(ite),Stdev(ite)2) as:
ite∼
{
G(Gmaxi υite, (Gmaxi σite)2),∀i ∈ IRs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E ,
G(gmaxi υite, (gmaxi σite)2), ∀i ∈ IˆRs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E ,
(4a)
where υite and σite are the normalized mean and standard
deviation of the forecast error, and Gmaxi and g
max
i are the
generation capacity of existing (IRs ) and candidate (IˆRs ) RES
generators. Next, the forecast power output of RES generators,
gite, can be modeled with a forecast factor ρite ∈ [0, 1] as:
gite=
{
ρiteG
max
i , ∀i ∈ IRs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E ,
ρiteg
max
i , ∀i ∈ IˆRs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E ,
(4b)
2The Gaussian distribution is used in this work due to its mathematical
tractability, while other probability distributions can be adopted to model fore-
cast errors with more accuracy (e.g. Laplace, logistic, student’s t-distributions,
see [20]).
Then, the output of RES generators follows as:
gite = gite + ite, ∀i ∈ IRs ∪ IˆRs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (4c)
Since forecast errors result in a real-time mismatch between
the power produced and consumed, controllable generation
resources must offset these deviations. In practice, the real-
time affine control is used, [21], and modeled as:
gite = gite−αit
∑
j∈IR
s(i)
∪IˆR
s(i)
jte, ∀i ∈ ICs ∪IˆCs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (4d)
where
∑
i∈ICs ∪IˆCs αit = 1 ensures the sufficiency of procured
balancing resources. Synchronized generators continuously
offset the power mismatch based on parameter αit, which
regulates the participation of each generator in balancing.
The value of αit can be set ahead of time, e.g. αit =
1/card(ICs ∪ IˆCs ), or optimized as in [14].
3) Power utility model: We assume the power utility com-
pany optimizes its generation expansion plan and optimizes its
operations, including the participation strategy in the whole-
sale electricity market as follows:
max
ΞU
OU :=
∑
e∈E
ωe
[∑
t∈T
∑
n∈Ns
pintdnte +
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈IˆR∪IR
τ egite
+
∑
i∈IˆR
τ cgmaxi −
∑
t∈T
( ∑
n∈Ns
λntednte−
∑
i∈I∪Iˆ
λn(i),t,egite
)
−
∑
i∈Iˆ
C invi g
max
i −
∑
i∈I
∑
t∈T
Cgi gite
] (5a)
P[gite ≤ Gmaxi ] ≥ 1− η, ∀i ∈ ICs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (5b)
P[gite ≥ Gmini ] ≥ 1− η, ∀i ∈ ICs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (5c)
P[gite ≤ gmaxi ] ≥ 1− η, ∀i ∈ IˆCs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (5d)
P[gite ≥ Γigmaxi ] ≥ 1− η, ∀i ∈ IˆCs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (5e)
Hmini ≤gite−gi,t−1,e≤Hmaxi , ∀i∈ICs ∪IˆCs , t ∈T , e ∈E ,(5f)∑
i∈Is∪Iˆs
gite +p
↓
nte =dnte, ∀t ∈ T , n ∈ Ns, e ∈ E , (5g)
−P ↓,maxn ≤ p↓nte ≤ P ↓,maxn , ∀t ∈ T , n ∈ Ns, e ∈ E , (5h)
where ΞU = {gmaxi , gite ≥ 0}. Objective function (5a) maxi-
mizes the profit of the power utility over the operating horizon
t ∈ T for each representative day e, which includes the pay-
ment collected from consumers, revenue from the wholesale
market participation and renewable energy incentives provided
by the state regulator. Investment cost C invi and capacity-
based incentive τ c are prorated on a daily basis using the
net present value approach as in [22]. Eqs. (5b)-(5e) limit
power outputs of existing and candidate resources, while
the RES uncertainty is captured via chance constraints with
random variable gite. Eq. (5f) limits the up- and downward
ramping rates for controllable generators. Finally, Eq. (5g)
enforces the supply demand balance, while Eq. (5h) enforces
the power flow limit (p↓nte) on the power flow between the
power utility and transmission network (and the wholesale
electricity market). Note that network constraints among nodes
n ∈ Ns within each state s are not imposed in Eq. (5), and the
power flows are constrained in the wholesale market problem,
see Eq. (6).
5C. LL problem (Wholesale market)
The wholesale electricity market for each representative day
e ∈ E , which includes the strategic participant modeled in the
ML problem and other non-strategic participants, solves:
max
ΞW
OWe :=
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I∪Iˆ
−Cgi gite (6a)
(ξlte) : flte =
1
Xl
(θo(l),te − θr(l),te), ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T , (6b)
(λnte) :
∑
i∈In∪Iˆn
gite +
∑
l|r(l)=n
flte−
∑
l|o(l)=n
flte
=
{
dnte, ∀n ∈ Ns, t ∈ T ,
Dnte, ∀n ∈ N\Ns, t ∈ T ,
(6c)
(γ
ite
, γite) : 0 ≤ gite ≤ gite, ∀i ∈ I ∪ Iˆ, t ∈ T , (6d)
(δlte, δlte) : −Fmaxl ≤ flte ≤ Fmaxl , ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T , (6e)
where ΞW = {gite, θnte, flte ≥ 0}. Objective function
(6a) maximizes the social welfare under inflexible wholesale
demand3, i.e. it minimizes the operating cost. Equation (6b)
models DC power flows and Eq. (6c) enforces the nodal power
balance in the transmission system, where o(l) and r(l) denote
originating and receiving nodes of line l, respectively. The
dual variable of Eq. (6c) (λnte) is then the locational marginal
price (LMP). Equations (6d)-(6e) limit generation outputs and
transmission line flows.
III. SOLUTION METHOD
To solve the proposed TL model effectively, we convert
chance constraints into a deterministic form, derive an equiva-
lent bi-level problem, and develop a C&CG algorithm variant
that deals with bilinear terms across levels.
A. Chance constraint reformulation
As in [23], chance constraints in Eqs. (5b)-(5e) can be
exactly reformulated as the following deterministic constraints:
gite − αit
( ∑
j∈IRs
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆRs
gmaxj υjte
)
+ Φ−1(1−η)Stdev[gite] ≤ Gmaxi , ∀i ∈ ICs , t ∈ T ,
(7a)
gite − αit
( ∑
j∈IRs
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆRs
gmaxj υjte
)
+ Φ−1(1−η)Stdev[gite] ≤ gmaxi , ∀i ∈ IˆCs , t ∈ T ,
(7b)
gite − αit
( ∑
j∈IRs
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆRs
gmaxj υjte
)
− Φ−1(1−η)Stdev[gite] ≥ Gmini , ∀i ∈ ICs , t ∈ T ,
(7c)
(7d)
3Note that the flexible demand modeled in Eq. (3) is internalized in the
ML problem, i.e. the power utility leverages all flexibility, and the wholesale
market thus deals with fixed demand curves, denoted as dnte for nodes in
strategically acting state and Dnte for others.
gite − αit
( ∑
j∈IRs
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆRs
gmaxj υjte
)
− Φ−1(1−η)Stdev[gite] ≥ Γigmaxi , ∀i ∈ IˆCs , t ∈ T ,
(7e)
Stdev[gite]=αit
√√√√ ∑
j∈IR
s(i)
(Gmaxj σjte)
2+
∑
j∈IˆR
s(i)
(gmaxj σjte)
2,
(7f)
where Φ−1(·) is the inverse cumulative distribution function of
the Gaussian distribution and Stdev[·] is a standard deviation
operator. Eq. (7f) assumes independence of random variables
{gite | ∀i∈IRs ∪IˆRs } across time t and representative days e.
B. Equivalent bi-level problem
Since the LL problem in Eq. (6) is a linear problem, it
is guaranteed to have a strict complementary solution by the
Goldman-Tucker theorem [24]. Hence, we can apply the strong
duality theorem to the LL problem and convert it into a set of
constraints, resulting in an equivalent ML and LL problem.
This equivalent problem makes it possible to convert the
proposed TL problem into an equivalent bi-level problem.
First, we formulate the dual problem of Eq. (6) for each
representative day e ∈ E as:
min
ΞDW
ODWe :=
∑
t∈T
( ∑
i∈I∪Iˆ
giteγite −
∑
n∈N
Dpnteλnte
+
∑
l∈L
(
Fmaxl δlte+F
max
l δlte
)) (8a)
(gpite) : −γite+γite−λn(i),te=−C
g
i , ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T , (8b)
(fplte) : −δlte + δlte + ξlte−λr(l),t,e + λo(l),t,e = 0,
∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T , (8c)
(θnte) : −
∑
l|o(l)=n
ξlte
Xl
+
∑
l|r(l)=n
ξlte
Xl
= 0, ∀n ∈ N , t ∈ T , (8d)
where ΞDW =
{
γ
ite
, γite, δlte, δlte ≥ 0; ξlte, λnte: free
}
.
Then, the proposed TL problem can be equivalently recast
as a compact bi-level problem:
Eq. (1) : UL problem (9a)
ΞU ∪ ΞW ∈ arg [
Eqs. (5a), (5f)–(5h), (7) : ML problem
Eqs. (6b)–(6e) : LL primal constraints
Eqs. (8b)–(8d) : LL dual constraints
OWe = O
DW
e , ∀e ∈ E : LL strong duality
]
.
(9b)
The complete formulation of (9) with all constraints de-
tailed is described in Appendix. It is noteworthy that du-
ality theory is not applicable to the combined ML and
LL problem in (9b) due to the existence of bilinear terms
τ egite, τ
cgmaxi , λn(i),t,egite in objective functions, and there-
fore, further conversion of the bi-level problem in (9) into an
exact single-level form is unattainable. This motivates the use
of the C&CG algorithm for solving (9) described in the next
subsection.
6C. Column-and-cut generation algorithm
The C&CG algorithm exploits the primary-secondary (also
known as master-slave) structure of Eq. (9) and generates
primal cuts and columns over iterations using primal informa-
tion exchanges between the master- and sub-problems. In our
case, as shown in Fig. 2, the master problem provides policy
decisions of the state regulator to the subproblem and receives
reported performance (expansion and dispatch decisions) in
return.
The C&CG algorithm as applied to Eq. (9) is detailed in
Algorithm 1. Step 1 initializes the lower and upper bounds of
the objective function (LB,UB) and the iteration counter (k).
Step 2-1 obtains initial solutions of the master problem without
any cut and update LB and given the UL solution, while Step
2-2 solves a subproblem, saves solutions, and update UB. Step
3 first updates the iteration counter (Step 3-1). Then it obtains
the master problem solution with k−1 sets of cuts generated
from the subproblem solutions from all the previous iterations
(1, . . . , k−1) and updates LB (Step 3-2). Finally, it solves
the subproblem with the solution of the master problem at the
current iteration k and updates UB (Step 3-3). This process
repeats until the convergence is achieved at a desired tolerance
level, (UB−LB)/UB ≤ , i.e., the approximation error of the
master problem on the subproblem objective (OU) is within
the desired tolerance level.
1) Subproblem: Equation (10) solves the combined ML
and LL equivalent problem, while the UL decisions of the
current iteration ΞR
(k)∗
are given. The subproblem is a bilinear
quadratic problem due to λntednte and λn(i),t,egite, and the
size of the subproblem does not change over the iterations:
max
ΞSP
OSP :=
∑
e∈E
ωe
[∑
t∈T
∑
n∈Ns
dntepi
(k),∗
nt +
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈IˆR∪IR
τ e
(k),∗
gite
+
∑
i∈IˆR
τ c
(k),∗
gmaxi −
∑
t∈T
( ∑
n∈Ns
λntednte−
∑
i∈I∪Iˆ
λn(i),t,egite
)
−
∑
i∈Iˆ
C invi g
max
i −
∑
i∈I
∑
t∈T
Cgi gite
]
(10a)
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Fig. 2. Implementation of the C&CG algorithm.
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First, we formulate the dual problem of Eq. (6) as:
min
⌅DW
ODWe :=
X
t2T
⇣ X
i2I[Iˆ
gite ite  
X
n2N
Dpnte nte
+
X
l2L
 
Fmaxl  lte+F
max
l  lte
 ⌘ (8a)
(gpite) :   ite+ ite  n(i),te= C
g
i , 8i 2 I, t 2 T , (8b)
(fplte) :   lte +  lte + ⇠lte  r(l),t,e +  o(l),t,e = 0,
8l 2 L, t 2 T , (8c)
(✓nte) :  
X
l|o(l)=n
⇠lte
Xl
+
X
l|r(l)=n
⇠lte
Xl
= 0, 8n 2 N , t 2 T , (8d)
where ⌅DW =
 
 
ite
,  ite,  lte,  lte   0; ⇠lte, nte: free
 
.
Then, the proposed TL problem can be equivalently recast
as a bi-level problem:
Eq. (1) : UL problem (9a)
⌅U [ ⌅W 2 arg ⇥
Eqs. (5a), (5f)–(5h), (7) : ML problem
Eqs. (6b)–(6e) : LL primal constraints
Eqs. (8b)–(8d) : LL dual constraints
OWe = O
DW
e , 8e 2 E : LL strong duality
⇤
(9b)
It is noteworthy that duality theory is not applicable to the
combined ML and LL problem in (9b) due to the existence
of bilinear t rms ⌧ egite, ⌧ cgmaxi , n(i),t,egite in objective func-
tions, and therefor , further c version of the bi-l vel problem
in (9) into an exact single-level form is unattainable. This
motivates the use of the C&CG algorithm for solving (9)
described in the next subs ction.
C. Column-and-cut generation algorithm
The C&CG algorithm exploits the primary-secondary (also
known s master-slave) structure of Eq. (9) nd generates
primal cut and columns over iterations using primal informa-
tion exchanges between the master- and ub-problems. In our
case, as shown in Fig. 2, the master problem provides policy
Fig. 2. Implementation of the C&CG algorithm.
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(gpite) :   ite +  ite    n(i),te =  C
g
i , 8i 2 I, (9b)
(fplte) :   lte +  lte + ⇠lte  r(l),t,e +  s(l),t,e = 0,
8l 2 L, (9c)
(✓nte) :  
X
l|s(l)=n
⇠lte
Xl
+
X
l|r(l)=n
⇠lte
Xl
= 0, 8n 2 N , (9d)
where ⌅DWe =
 
 
ite
,  ite,  lte,  lte   0; ⇠lte, nte: free
 
.
Then the proposed TL problem can be equivalently recast
as a bi-level problem:
Eq. (2) : UL problem (10a)
⌅Ue [ ⌅We 2 arg
⇥
Eqs. (6a), (6g), (6h), (8) : ML problem
Eqs. (7b)–(7e) : LL primal constraints
Eqs. (9b)–(9d) : LL dual constraints
OWe = O
DW
e : LL strong duality
⇤
(10b)
It is noteworthy that duality theory is not applicable to the
combined ML and LL problem in (10b) due to the existence
of bilinear terms ⌧ egite, ⌧ cgmaxi , n(i),t,egite in objective func-
tions, and therefore, further conversion of the bi-level problem
in (10) into an exact single-level form is unattainable. This
motivates the use of the C&CG algorithm for solving (10)
described in the next subsection.
C. Column-and-cut generation algorithm
The C&CG algorithm exploits the prima y/secondary (a.k.a
master-slave) structure and generates primal cuts and columns
over iterations based on primal information exchanges between
the master- and sub-problems. In our case, as shown in Fig. 2,
the master problem provides policy decisions of the state
regulator to the subproblem and receives reported performance
(expansion and dispatch decisions) sequentially.
This C&CG algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 1. Step 1
initializes the lower and upper bounds of the objective function
(LB,UB) and t e it ratio counter (k). Step 2-1 obtains initial
solutions of the master problem without any cut and update
LB, and given the UL solutions, Step 2-2 solves a subproblem,
Fig. 2. Master-sub problem interactions of C&CG algorithm
Algorithm 1: C&CG Algorithm
1. Initialization: LB :=  1, UB := +1, k := 1
2. Iteration 1:
2-1. Solve the master problem w/o cuts:
⌅R
(1)⇤
,⌅U
⇤
,⌅W
⇤  arg {Eqs. (11a)  (11f)}
LB  max{LB, OU(⌅R(1)⇤ ,⌅U⇤ ,⌅W⇤)}
2-2. Solve the subproblem:
⌅U
(1)⇤
,⌅W
(1)⇤  arg{Eq. (12) | ⌅R(1)⇤}
UB  min{UB, OU(⌅R(1)⇤ ,⌅U(1)⇤ ,⌅W(1)⇤)}
3. Iteration: while (UB LB)/UB > " do
3-1. Iteration counter update: k  k + 1
3-2. Solve the master problem w/ cuts:
⌅R
(k)⇤
,⌅U
⇤
,⌅W
⇤  
arg {Eq. (11) | ⌅U(j 1)⇤ , 8j = 2, . . . , k}
LB  max{LB, OU(⌅R(k)⇤ ,⌅U⇤ ,⌅W⇤)}
3-3. Solve the subproblem:
⌅U
(k)⇤
,⌅W
(k)⇤  arg{Eq. (12) | ⌅R(k)⇤}
UB  min{UB, OU(⌅R(k)⇤ ,⌅U(k)⇤ ,⌅W(k)⇤)}
end
return ⌅R = ⌅R
(k)⇤
,⌅U = ⌅U
(k)⇤
,⌅W = ⌅W
(k)⇤
save solutions, and update UB. Step 3 first updates the
iteration counter (Step 3-1), obtains solutions from the master
problem with k 1 sets of cuts generated from subproblem
solutions of all the previous iterations (1, . . . , k   1), and
update LB (Step 3-2), and finally, solves the subproblem
with the solutions of the master problem at the current
iteration k, and update UB (Step 3-3). This process repeats
until the convergence is achieved at the desired tolerance,
(UB   LB)/UB  ✏.
1) Master problem: Equation (11a) maximizes the objec-
tive function of state regulator s over variables of all three
levels, where Eqs. (11b)–(11d) define feasible regions of each
level. Eqs. (11d)–(11f) ensure the LL optimum is achieved. In
addition, k   1 sets of column-and-cut generation constraints
are imposed in Eqs. (11g)–(11o). For every CCG set, a cut
with respect to the ML objective function is generated in
Eq. (11g), with oracular knowledge of ⌅U
(j)⇤
given from
the subproblem. Eqs. (11h)–(11o) keep auxiliary variables in
⌅Aux
(j)
to remain within feasible regions of the LL problem.
Note that the master problem is a bilinear quadratic program
and the number of auxiliary variables and constraints increase
proportionally to the number of iteration.
Algorithm 1: C&CG Algorithm
1. Initialization: LB :=  1, UB := +1, k := 1
2. Iteration 1:
2-1. Solve the master problem w/o cuts:
⌅R
(1)⇤
,⌅U
⇤
,⌅W
⇤  arg {Eqs. (11a)  (11f)}
LB  max{LB, OU(⌅R(1)⇤ ,⌅U⇤ ,⌅W⇤)}
2-2. Solve the subproblem:
⌅U
(1)⇤
,⌅W
(1)⇤  arg{Eq. (10) | ⌅R(1)⇤}
UB  min{UB, OU(⌅R(1)⇤ ,⌅U(1)⇤ ,⌅W(1)⇤)}
3. Iteration: while (UB LB)/UB > " do
3-1. Iteration counter update: k  k + 1
3-2. Solve the master problem w/ cuts:
⌅R
(k)⇤
,⌅U
⇤
,⌅W
⇤  
arg {Eq. (11) | ⌅U(j 1)⇤ , 8j = 2, . . . , k}
LB  max{LB, OU(⌅R(k)⇤ ,⌅U⇤ ,⌅W⇤)}
3-3. Solve the subproblem:
⌅U
(k)⇤
,⌅W
(k)⇤  arg{Eq. (10) | ⌅R(k)⇤}
UB  min{UB, OU(⌅R(k)⇤ ,⌅U(k)⇤ ,⌅W(k)⇤)}
end
return ⌅R = ⌅R
(k)⇤
,⌅U = ⌅U
(k)⇤
,⌅W = ⌅W
(k)⇤
decisions of the state regulator to the subproblem and receives
reported performance (expansion and dispatch decisions) in
return.
The C&CG algorithm as applied t Eq. (9) is detailed in
Algorithm 1. Step 1 initializes the lower and uppe bounds of
the objective function (LB,UB) and the iteration count r (k).
Step 2-1 obtains initial solutions of the master problem without
any cut and update LB and given the UL solution, while Step
2-2 solves a subproblem, saves solutions, and update UB. Step
3 first updates the iteration counter (Step 3-1). Then it obtains
the master problem solution with k 1 sets of cuts generated
from the subproblem solutions from all the previous iterations
(1, . . . , k 1) and updates LB (Step 3-2). Finally, it solves
subject to:
Eqs. (5f)–(5h), (7) : ML constraints (10b)
Eqs. (6b)–(6e) : LL primal constraints (10c)
Eqs. (8b)–(8d) : LL dual constraints (10d)
OWe = O
DW
e , ∀e ∈ E : LL strong duality (10e)
where ΞSP := ΞU ∪ ΞW.
2) Master problem: Equation (11a) minimizes the objective
function of state regulator s over variables of all three levels,
where Eqs. (11b)–(11d) define feasible regions of each level.
Eqs. (11d)–(11f) ensur the LL optimum is achieved. In
addition, k − 1 sets of column-and-cut generation constraints
are imposed in Eqs. (11g)–(11o). For every C&CG set, a
cut with respect to the ML objective function is generated in
Eq. (11g), with oracular knowledge of ΞU
(j)∗
given from the
subproblem. This allows the master problem to approximate
the possible decision-making of the ML and LL problem.
Eqs. (11h)–(11o) keep auxiliary variables in ΞAux
(j)
within
feasible regions of the LL problem. Note that similarly to
the subproblem the master problem is also bilinear quadratic,
but the number of auxiliary variables and constraints increase
proportionally to the number of iterations:
min
ΞMP
ORs =
∑
t∈T
∑
e∈E
ωe
[ ∑
n∈Ns
Dntepint +
∑
i∈IˆR∪IR
giteτ
e
]
+
∑
i∈IˆR
gmaxi τ
c
(11a)
subject to:
Eqs. (1b)–(1d) : UL constraints (11b)
Eqs. (5f)–(5h), (7) : ML constraints (11c)
Eqs. (6b)–(6e) : LL primal constraints (11d)
7Eqs. (8b)–(8d) : LL dual constraints (11e)
OWe = O
DW
e , ∀e ∈ E : LL strong duality (11f)
with the C&CG constraints updated at every iteration k as:[∑
t∈T
∑
n∈Ns
dntepint +
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈IˆR∪IR
τ egite
+
∑
i∈IˆR
τ cgmaxi −
∑
t∈T
( ∑
n∈Ns
λntednte−
∑
i∈I∪Iˆ
λn(i),t,egite
)
−
∑
i∈Iˆ
C invi g
max
i −
∑
i∈I
∑
t∈T
Cgi gite ≥∑
t∈T
∑
n∈Ns
dntepint +
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈IˆR∪IR
τ eg
(j)
ite
+
∑
i∈IˆR
τ cgmax
(j−1),∗
i −
∑
t∈T
( ∑
n∈Ns
λ
(j)
ntednte−
∑
i∈I∪Iˆ
λ
(j)
n(i),t,eg
(j)
ite
)
−
∑
i∈Iˆ
C invi g
max(j−1),∗
i −
∑
i∈I
∑
t∈T
Cgi g
(j)
ite
(11g)
f
(j)
lte =
1
Xl
(θ
(j)
o(l),te − θ(j)r(l),te), ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T , (11h)∑
i∈In∪Iˆn
g
(j)
ite +
∑
l|r(l)=n
f
(j)
lte −
∑
l|o(l)=n
f
(j)
lte
=
{
dnte, ∀n ∈ Ns, t ∈ T ,
Dnte, ∀n ∈ N\Ns, t ∈ T ,
(11i)
0 ≤ g(j)ite ≤ g(j−1),∗ite , ∀i ∈ I ∪ Iˆ, t ∈ T , (11j)
− Fmaxl ≤ f (j)lte ≤ Fmaxl , ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T , (11k)
− γ(j)
ite
+ γ
(j)
ite − λ(j)n(i),t,e = −Cgi , ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T , (11l)
−δ(j)lte+δ
(j)
lte+ξ
(j)
lte−λ(j)r(l),t,e+λ(j)o(l),t,e=0, ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T ,
(11m)
−
∑
l|o(l)=n
ξ
(j)
lte
Xl
+
∑
l|r(l)=n
ξ
(j)
lte
Xl
= 0, ∀n ∈ N , t ∈ T , (11n)
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I∪Iˆ
−Cgi g(j)ite =
∑
t∈T
( ∑
i∈I∪Iˆ
g
(j−1),∗
ite γ
(j)
ite
−
∑
n∈N
Dnteλ
(j)
nte +
∑
l∈L
(
Fmaxl δ
(j)
lte+F
max
l δ
(j)
lte
)) (11o)
]
, ∀e ∈ E , j = 2, . . . , k,
where ΞMP := (ΞR∪ΞU∪ΞW)∪⋃kj=2 ΞAux(j) and ΞAux(j) :=
{g(j)ite , θ(j)nte, f (j)lte , ξ(j)lte , λ(j)nte : free; γ(j)ite, γ
(j)
ite, δ
(j)
lte , δ
(j)
lte ≥ 0}.
IV. CASE STUDY
We use the 8-zone ISO New England (ISO-NE) test system
[26], covering six states with the RPS goals as in Fig. 3.
Table I and Table II report the current generation mix and cost
characteristics of candidate generators. Expansion decisions of
non-strategic states are computed based on the model in [27].
Similarly to [28], we use a hierarchical clustering algorithm
[29] to identify 5 representative days from historical hourly
demand and renewable generation forecast data collected from
VT
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SEMACT RI
Massachusetts
41.1% by 2030
Maine
100% by 2050
New Hampshire
25.2% by 2025
Vermont
75% by 2032
Connecticut
44% by 2030
Rhode Island
38.5% by 2035
Fig. 3. An 8-zone ISO-NE system with RPS goals as of 01/01/2020.
the ISO-NE data library [30], [31]. All fossil-fueled generators
are assumed to be committed and the renewable forecast error
is zero-mean and has σite = 0.1 for wind and σite = 0.2 for
solar, while η = 0.03. Generation resources in non-strategic
states are assumed to offer their full capacity to the market
at their marginal cost. Using the investment recovery period
of 10 years and a discount rate of 5%, C invi is prorated on a
daily basis using a net present value approach. Affine control
parameters are set as predefined values αit = 1/card(ICs ∪IˆCs )
[21], [32]. Demand-side parameters in Eq. (3) are N = 0.25
and M = 0.25Dnte + 20 [19], while peak TOU hours are set
as 13:00-21:00, [33]. All models are implemented using Julia
v1.3/JuMP v0.21 and solved by the KNITRO solver v12.1 on
an Intel Xeon 2.6 GHz CPU with 124GB of memory. The solu-
tion procedure is initialized with 300 different starting points,
which improves computational performance and overcomes
potential issues arising from inborn local optimality of the
bilinear quadratic problems. The average computation time of
the C&CG algorithm was 97.4 hours with at most 5 iterations,
which is acceptable for long-term planning problems when
there is no pressure to instantly enforce the optimal decisions.
The input data and code are available in [34].
TABLE I. GENERATION CAPACITY BY STATE AND TYPE [MW]
ME NH VT MA CT RI
Wind 221.2 140.5 39.0 681.7 132.5 85.0
Solar 41.4 83.8 306.3 1871.3 464.3 116.7
Nuclear – 1244.0 620.2 684.7 2116.0 –
Coal 311.8 95.4 – 144.4 744.4 1099.5
Oil 1146.9 400.2 – 1111.7 2212.8 435.0
Natural Gas 3862.7 508.0 – 2249.6 621.4 3491.6
TABLE II. INVESTMENT AND OPERATION COSTS OF CANDIDATE
GENERATORS [25]
Wind Solar Natural Gas
Investment Cost, $/kW 1630 2434 895
Operating Cost, $/MWh 1.1 0.4 20.0
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Fig. 4. (a) Relationship between the optimal energy-based incentives
and electricity tariff and (b) comparison between the consumer
payment and the cost of energy-based incentives.
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Fig. 5. (a) Relationship between the optimal capacity-based incen-
tives and electricity tariff and (b) comparison between the consumer
payment and the cost of capacity-based incentives.
A. NH Case: investment, policy, cost decisions
This section focuses on the NH case because it has the
earliest RPS goal among other states. The RPS goal is achieved
by installing 602 MW of wind generation resources and
requires no enhancement to the fossil-fueled mix (due to a high
operating cost). Fig. 4 and 5 present the optimal incentives
and average tariff (Et[pint]), which is computed for each case
based on the hourly TOU values in Fig. 6, to support the
RPS goal in NH, as well as itemizes the power utility revenue
from both the incentives and tariffs. Both the energy- and
capacity-based incentives linearly depend on the average tariff.
Indeed, as the average tariff reduces, which in turn leads to a
lower consumer payment, greater energy and capacity-based
incentives are needed to achieve the same RPS goal. Notably,
as Fig. 4 and 5 show, the energy-based incentive of $20/MWh
and the capacity-based incentive of $600/kW yield the same
value of the average tariff to achieve the NH RPS goal.
Fig. 7–9 compare the average dispatch and LMPs across
the entire ISO NE test system before and after achieving RPS
goals. Due to the increased wind capacity, NH produces more
wind power and reduces the usage of fossil-fueled resources
(e.g. natural gas). Despite this reduction, the amount of power
exported from NH to other states increases as shown in
Fig. 7(b). As a result of these dispatch changes, LMPs in the
system decrease by ≈2.5% on average as shown in Fig. 9.
Next, to analyze the sensitivity of the optimal policy deci-
sions in Fig. 4 and 5, the current NH RPS goal is compared
to the lower and higher targets, which are set to 85% and
115% of the original RPS goal. As Fig. 10 shows, the linear
relationship between the average tariff and the energy- and
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Fig. 6. Optimal time-of-use (TOU) electricity tariffs for (a) energy-
based and (b) capacity-based incentives. The darker the color, the
higher the value of incentives.
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Fig. 7. Dispatch of generators and demand in NH: (a) before and
(b) after implementing RPS goals.
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Fig. 10. Sensitivity of the relationship between the optimal incentives
and electricity tariff to an RPS goal.
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Fig. 11. Sensitivity of the relationship between the optimal incentives
and electricity tariff in ME, MA and NH to coal retirements.
capacity-based incentives perseveres. Furthermore, the slope
in Fig. 10 becomes steeper for the high RPS scenario, thus
indicating that a higher RPS goal requires either a greater
average tariff for consumers or greater incentives.
B. Comparison with the MA and ME cases
The results attained in Section IV-A can be extended to the
MA and ME cases, which have 41.1 and 100% RPS goals
as in Fig. 3. In the following, we also compared the case
with no retirement (base case) and the case with the full
retirement of coal-fired resources. As Fig. 11 shows, the linear
relationship between the average tariff and the energy- and
capacity-based incentives persevere for all scenarios. However,
a more aggressive RPS goal leads to a steeper slope.
The difference between the base and retirement cases man-
ifests itself differently for each state. There is almost no
difference in the most aggressive RPS case of ME, where
311.8MW of coal-fired resources can be retired with no
implications on the optimal policies. This is due to the fact
that the state of ME has a 100% RPS goal, and thus, coal-
fired resources would not be dispatched due to a relatively
high operating cost once the renewable generation expansion
is made. In the case of MA, the retirement will increase the
policy incentives needed to support the RPS goal for the
same average tariff. On the other hand, in the case of NH,
coal retirements reduce both the incentives and average tariffs
needed to support their modest RPS goal. This is due to the
replacement of coal-fired resources in the optimal dispatch
with relatively cheap wind and gas producer.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a TL framework to support a renew-
able policy decision-making process of a state regulator that
internalizes conflicting interests of different stakeholders. The
resulting problem is a computationally complex TL bilinear
optimization problem and, thus, the C&CG algorithm is im-
plemented to solve it efficiently. The case study compared
the optimal policies supporting the implementation of RPS
goals. The numerical results obtained from the the 8-zone
ISO NE test system demonstrated that a more ambitious RPS
target requires either an increased electricity tariff (consumer
payment) or higher RES incentives (policy support) under the
same retirement scenario. Furthermore, our numerical results
demonstrate that there is a linear relationship between the
RES incentives and the average electricity tariff to implement
given RPS goals. However, the retirement policy of fossil-
fueled generators such as coal-fired power plants can increase
or decrease the total cost (incentives and tariffs hikes) of
achieving the same given RPS goals, depending on the current
generation mix of the jurisdiction.
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APPENDIX
The complete bi-level reformulation of the proposed TL
problem in Eq. (9) is as follows:
min
ΞR
ORs :=
∑
t∈T
∑
e∈E
ωe
[ ∑
n∈Ns
Dntepint +
∑
i∈IˆR∪IR
giteτ
e
]
+
∑
i∈IˆR
gmaxi τ
c
(12a)
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈IRs ∪IˆRs
giteτ
e +
∑
i∈IˆRs
gmaxi τ
c ≤ BPs , ∀e ∈ E , (12b)∑
t∈T
∑
i∈IRs ∪IˆRs
gite ≥ κs
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈Ns
Dnte, ∀e ∈ E , (12c)
OU(gmaxi , gite) ≥ 0, (12d)
pint =
{
pionn , ∀t ∈ T on,
pioffn , ∀t ∈ T off ,
(12e)
ΞU ∪ ΞW ∈ arg
[
max
ΞU
OU :=
∑
e∈E
ωe
[∑
t∈T
∑
n∈Ns
pintdnte +
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈IˆR∪IR
τ egite
+
∑
i∈IˆR
τ cgmaxi −
∑
t∈T
( ∑
n∈Ns
λntednte−
∑
i∈I∪Iˆ
λn(i),t,egite
)
−
∑
i∈Iˆ
C invi g
max
i −
∑
i∈I
∑
t∈T
Cgi gite
] (12f)
gite − αit
( ∑
j∈IRs
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆRs
gmaxj υjte
)
+ Φ−1(1−η)Stdev[gite] ≤ Gmaxi , ∀i ∈ ICs , t ∈ T ,
(12g)
gite − αit
( ∑
j∈IRs
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆRs
gmaxj υjte
)
+ Φ−1(1−η)Stdev[gite] ≤ gmaxi , ∀i ∈ IˆCs , t ∈ T ,
(12h)
gite − αit
( ∑
j∈IRs
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆRs
gmaxj υjte
)
− Φ−1(1−η)Stdev[gite] ≥ Gmini , ∀i ∈ ICs , t ∈ T ,
(12i)
gite − αit
( ∑
j∈IRs
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆRs
gmaxj υjte
)
− Φ−1(1−η)Stdev[gite] ≥ Γigmaxi , ∀i ∈ IˆCs , t ∈ T ,
(12j)
Hmini ≤gite−gi,t−1,e≤Hmaxi , ∀i∈ICs ∪IˆCs , t ∈T , e ∈E,(12k)∑
i∈Is∪Iˆs
gite +p
↓
nte =dnte, ∀t ∈ T , n ∈ Ns, e ∈ E , (12l)
−P ↓,maxn ≤ p↓nte ≤ P ↓,maxn , ∀t ∈ T , n ∈ Ns, e ∈ E , (12m)
flte =
1
Xl
(θo(l),te − θr(l),te), ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T , (12n)∑
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